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California’s unfair competition law can be so “exquisitely ridiculous,
it would confound Kafka. In a case that abounds with moral
ironies, the worse is this: The avenger may be guilty of the greater
crime.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
In the spring of 2002, a group of young lawyers created a
moneymaking plan. The plan was a simple one: (a) set up a shell plaintiff
purporting to be a “consumer group”; (b) search agency websites for
businesses that had been issued notices of minor regulatory violations;
and (c) file omnibus claims against thousands of businesses “on behalf
of the general public” under California’s Unfair Competition Law
(UCL). The Beverly Hills based Trevor Law Group named as defendants
approximately 2200 auto repair shops. Trevor Law Group also filed UCL
claims against more than 1000 restaurants and markets, many of which
were owned by immigrants. Trevor Law Group’s only prerequisite for
suing was that the business’s name had been posted on the website
violation pages of either the California Bureau of Automotive Repair or
the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services.2 The only way
1. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1114 (Cal.
1998) (Brown, J. dissenting).
2. In re Damian S. Trevor, No. 03-TE-00998-RAH, slip op. at 20–21 (Cal. State
Bar Ct. May 21, 2003). The Bureau of Automotive Repair did not attach a penalty to the
notices, and the website contained a disclaimer stating that the Bureau made no
guarantees as to the accuracy or timeliness of the information. Id. at 20. Nevertheless,
Trevor Law Group did not investigate or monitor the defendant businesses. “They only
used the limited information posted on the Bureau website as the basis for UCL lawsuits.
They also knowingly sued businesses that had resolved the allegations with the Bureau
or with the customers.” Id. In December 2002, the Bureau suspended posting of the
notices of violations due in part to Trevor Law Group’s misuse of the information to
secure UCL settlements. Id. at 21. Similarly, the Los Angeles County Department of
Health Services website posted a disclaimer regarding possible errors in the notice of
violation information posted. Id.
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defendants could avoid protracted and costly litigation was by signing a
secret settlement agreement for an amount between $6000 and $26,000,
according to a form letter Trevor Law Group sent defendants.3 The
Attorney General’s Office estimated that the cozenage had the potential
to net $22 million.4 According to the State Bar Court, Trevor Law Group
settled approximately seventy to eighty claims before the deception was
revealed.5
Trevor Law Group was not alone in using the UCL for illicit gain
rather than vindicating consumer rights. The Attorney General’s office
took action in 2003 alleging that a partner in an Orange County law firm
used the UCL to file fraudulent claims against nail salons. The claims
alleged that the salons were in violation of the Code of Barbering and
Cosmetology because they used the same bottle of nail polish for more
than one patron.6 According to the Attorney General, a major problem
with the claims was that no such one bottle per patron regulation exists.7
These recent abuses spurred yet another round of legislative and
popular debate over the problems created by the breadth and unique
standing features of Business and Professions Code section 17200, a
consumer statute that has inspired a multitude of proposals and
criticisms over the years.8 Included in much of that debate was the fact
that Trevor Law Group and its counterparts had misused the law.
Instead of using section 17200 to protect the public from unfair
competition, the plaintiffs abused the UCL’s broad standing provision to
3. Id. at 27. A typical form letter read as follows:
[Y]our company is being sued. Other shops have received notice as well.
Some have challenged their lawsuits based on technicalities and now find
themselves—after spending a lot of time, money, and energy—in exactly the
same position in which they were initially. After all of that, they have two
options: either pay even more money to fight in court or settle out of court and
get on with business.
Id. at 26 n.19.
4. Complaint at 6, State v. Trevor Law Group (Cal. Super. Ct., County of Los
Angeles, Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://.caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2003/03-021.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
5. In re Trevor, No. 03-TE-00998-RAH, at 15.
6. Complaint at 4, State v. Brar (Cal. Super. Ct., County of Orange, July 8, 2003),
available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2003/03-085.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2004).
7. Id.
8. Eleven reform bills were drafted in 2003 alone. Jeff Chorney, L.A. Attorneys
at Center of 17200 Debate Could Lose Their Bar Cards, S.F. RECORDER, Mar. 14, 2003,
available at WL 3/14/2003-SF 1. All further statutory references are to California’s
Business and Professions Code unless otherwise provided.
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commit unfair competitive acts themselves.9
However, unlike previous years, the debate over the UCL in 2004
culminated with the passage of Proposition 64, a voter initiative that
curtails the breadth of the consumer statute by effectively limiting much
of the law’s enforcement to public prosecutors. Private individuals may
no longer bring a UCL claim on behalf of the public without meeting
class certification requirements and without demonstrating that they
themselves have been harmed by the alleged unfair competitive act.10
While Proposition 64 will undoubtedly put an end to abuses, such as
those committed by Trevor Law Group, it remains to be seen whether
the Proposition will be the much needed cure-all for a law designed to
protect the public from unfair business practices.
B. Purpose and Scope
This Comment will discuss the problems underlying California’s
Unfair Competition Law that eventually led to the adoption of
Proposition 64. It will also assess the Proposition’s method of addressing
those problems, which arose due to the UCL’s broad standing provision
and lack of res judicata effect.11 Additionally, this Comment will look at
outstanding issues not remedied by the recent amendments to 17200, as
well as review recent judicial decisions and evaluate their success at
clarifying a law that one California Supreme Court Justice has dubbed a
“growth industry.”12
9. In an ironic twist, the Attorney General utilized section 17200 to prosecute the
very same attorneys who had abused it. The Attorney General alleged that by entering
into confidential settlement agreements, Trevor Law Group concealed its “compromise
of the public interest in order to benefit [itself]” and therefore had committed an “unfair
practice.” Complaint at 9, Trevor Law Group (Cal. Super. Ct., County of Los Angeles,
Feb. 26, 2003). Furthermore, Trevor Law Group allegedly misrepresented the UCL
when it promised that settlement would preclude additional lawsuits by others, which
section 17200 does not do. Id. Similarly, the Attorney General alleged that the Orange
County firm violated section 17200 “by attempting to obtain, as part of their settlement
scheme, civil penalties which may only be awarded in actions brought by public
officials . . . .” Complaint at 7–8, Brar (No. 54773).
10. See Official Voter Information Guide, California General Election, Nov. 2,
2004. The language of Proposition 64 can be found at the California Secretary of State’s
website, available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop64-title.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2004). The language of the proposition is discussed infra Part IV and
provided in full in notes 115 and 117.
11. Res judicata provides that existing final judgments rendered upon the merits by
a court of competent jurisdiction are conclusive of the rights and questions of facts at
issue as to the parties and their privies. “Res Judicata is a common law doctrine that
signifies ‘claim or cause of action preclusion’ in contrast to collateral estoppel, which is
‘issue or fact preclusion.’” Res judicata and collateral estoppel have the same general
objective, which is finality of litigation. See WARREN FREEDMAN, RES JUDICATA AND
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: TOOLS FOR PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS 1 (1988).
12. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1106 (Cal.

1836

BLACKSTON.DOC

8/21/2019 3:48 PM

[VOL. 41: 1833, 2004]

California’s Unfair Competition Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the UCL prior to the
passage of Proposition 64, focusing on what the law does and the policy
justifications behind it. Part III illustrates the common UCL abuses that
led to a need for reform, how the abuses occur and why due process
considerations made judicial remedies difficult. Part IV discusses the
impact of Proposition 64 and evaluates the amendments to 17200, which
do away with what had been the law’s unique standing provision. Part V
proposes additional fine tuning of the law in order to maintain the UCL’s
policy of deterring unfair business practices.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE UCL
A. Statutory and Historical Review
California’s UCL initiated in the state’s Civil Code in 1872.13 In its
original form, under former Civil Code section 3369, the UCL provided
a statutory cause of action for traditional business torts.14 In 1933, the
section was extensively rewritten to: (1) expressly grant authority to
enjoin unfair competition; (2) define unfair competition to include an
unfair or fraudulent business practice as well as misleading advertising;
and (3) permit a person acting in the interest of the general public to
bring an action for an injunction.15 In 1976, the law was amended to
allow for orders of restitution.16
Despite its broad definition of unfair competition, public prosecutors
did not rely upon the statute as a consumer protection provision until the
late 1950s.17 The UCL did not become widely used by private plaintiffs
until the 1970s after the seminal decision of Barquis v. Merchants
Collection Ass’n.18 In 1977, the UCL was moved to section 17200 et
seq. of California’s Business and Professions Code.19 The legislature
most recently amended the law in 1992 when it broadened the UCL to
1998) (Brown, J., dissenting). Justice Brown also disparaged the UCL as “[t]he creation
of a standardless, limitless, attorney fees machine.” Id. at 1115.
13. Robert C. Fellmeth, California’s Unfair Competition Act: Conundrums and
Confusions, 26 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REPORTS 227, 231 (1995) [hereinafter
Conundrums].
14. Id.
15. Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 727 (Cal. 2000).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 496 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1972).
19. See Kraus, 999 P.2d at 727. All further statutory references are to California’s
Business and Professions Code unless otherwise specified.
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(1) cover a single act of unfair competition and (2) apply to out-of-state
activities that affect California consumers.20
The UCL prohibits “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or
practice[s]”21 and serves as a “wide standard to guide courts of equity.”22
Prior to the passage of Proposition 64, the law’s broad standing
provision allowed just about anyone to bring an unfair competition claim
on behalf of himself or the general public regardless of whether the
plaintiff had been injured by the unfair competitive act.23 Courts “of
competent jurisdiction”24 are empowered under the UCL to “enjoin
ongoing wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity
might occur.”25
The primary remedies available under the UCL are restitution and
injunction.26 However, in actions by public prosecutors, civil penalties
of up to $2500 per violation may be assessed. An additional $2500 fine
may be assessed if the unfair competitive act was perpetrated against a
senior citizen or disabled person.27

20. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1097 (Cal.
1998).
21. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997).
22. Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass’n, 496 P.2d 817, 830 (Cal. 1972). In 1992,
the legislature amended section 17200 of California’s Business and Professions Code to
include any “act” of unfair competition as well as practices. That same year, the
Legislature also amended section 17203 to “expand the scope of injunctive relief to
encompass past activity and out-of-state activity.” See also Stop Youth Addiction, Inc.
v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1097 (Cal. 1998).
23. Along with a variety of public prosecutors, including the Attorney General and
District Attorneys, section 17204 granted standing to “any person acting for the interests
of itself, its members or the general public.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204.
24. Id.
25. People v. McKale, 602 P.2d 731, 734 (Cal. 1979). The “court of competent
jurisdiction” requirement was given teeth in Greenlining Institute v. Public Utilities
Commission, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736 (Ct. App. 2002). In Greenlining, the court of appeal
held that the Public Utilities Commission could not entertain section 17200 claims
because the commission was not a court of competent jurisdiction. “Actions seeking any
relief under section 17200 et seq. ‘shall,’ i.e., must, be brought in court.” Id. at 739–40.
26. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (“Any person who engages, has
engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined.” Additionally,
“[t]he court may make such orders or judgments . . . to restore to any person in interest
any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of . . .
unfair competition.”). Id.
27. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206.1(a). Section 17206(a) provides that
violators “shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred
dollars ($2,500) for each violation . . . .” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206(a). In
addition, section 17206.1(a) provides that “any person who violates this chapter, and the
act or acts of unfair competition are perpetrated against one or more senior citizens or
disabled persons, may be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five
hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation . . . .” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206.1(a).
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1. Unlawful, Fraudulent, or Unfair
Unfair competition is defined to include business practices that are
either unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair.28 “Put simply, a business act or
practice is ‘unlawful’ if it violates some other law.”29 The UCL “borrows”
violations of other laws, making it possible for plaintiffs to bring section
17200 actions regardless of whether the underlying statute grants
standing.30 Virtually any federal, state, or local law can serve as the
predicate for a section 17200 action.31 For example, a UCL claim may
be brought against a defendant who has violated the penal code even
where the code does not allow for a private right of action.32
In interpreting the UCL prior to the passage of Proposition 64, the
California Supreme Court held that “it is in enacting the UCL itself, and
not by virtue of particular predicate statutes, that the Legislature has
conferred upon private plaintiffs ‘specific power’ to prosecute unfair

28. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200. Section 17200 states that “[a]s used in this
chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . . .”
29. JULIA B. STRICKLAND ET AL., AN OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAW, 1362 PLI/CORP. 531, 554 (2003), available at WL 1362 PLI/Corp.
531. The California Supreme Court has stated that the legislature intended the
“sweeping” language of the UCL to include “‘anything that can properly be called a
business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.’” Bank of the West v.
Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 553 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Barquis v. Merchs. Collection
Ass’n, 496 P.2d 817, 830 (Cal. 1972)).
30. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 730, 734 (Cal. 1992) (holding
that the UCL borrows violations from other laws and treats the violations when
committed in conjunction with a business activity as independently actionable under
section 17200). “The unfair competition law, moreover, states that ‘[u]nless otherwise
expressly provided, the remedies . . . are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or
penalties available under all other laws of this state.’” Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1099 (Cal. 1998) (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
17205 (West 1997)). Borrowed violations can stem from state, federal, municipal, and
administrative regulation. See James Wheaton, California Business and Professional
Code Section 17200: The Biggest Hammer in the Toolbox?, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 421,
426 (2001).
31. One limitation of the unlawful prong was seen in Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc.,
69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623 (Ct. App. 1997), where the Court of Appeal held that an unfair
competition action cannot be brought under the unlawful prong of the UCL when the
action is based on the unintentional distribution of a defective product. The court held
that liability imposed under the doctrines of strict products liability and breach of the
implied warranty of fitness do not by themselves describe acts or practices that are
illegal, and therefore cannot be a predicate for a UCL action based on the unlawful
prong. Id. at 625–26.
32. Stop Youth Addiction, 950 P.2d at 1091.
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competition claims.”33 If a UCL claim is brought based on violation of a
predicate statute, it stands to reason that any successful defense as to the
predicate law will necessarily preclude the 17200 action.34 Additionally,
the California Supreme Court has adopted a safe harbor provision,
stating that a plaintiff may not bring a UCL action against a practice that
the legislature expressly permits.35
Fraudulent practices are those that are likely to deceive members of
the public.36 Any violation of California’s false advertising law is
deemed to necessarily violate the state’s UCL as well.37 Unlike common
law fraud, allegations of actual deception, reasonable reliance, and damage
are not necessary to bring a UCL claim based on the “fraudulent” prong
of section 17200.38
The likely to deceive requirement implies more than a mere possibility
that the alleged unfair competitive act might conceivably be misunderstood
by a handful of unsophisticated consumers.39 Instead, the UCL applies
an ordinary or reasonable consumer standard when determining whether
a business practice is likely to deceive.40 However, where advertising is
aimed at a particularly susceptible group of consumers, such as children,
its truthfulness is measured by the impact it will likely have on members
of that group.41
Defining acts that fall within the unfair prong of the UCL has been a
difficult task. California courts have long recognized the difficulty in
predetermining what acts constitute unfair business, noting that “it
would be impossible to draft in advance detailed plans and specifications
of all acts and conduct to be prohibited . . . since unfair or fraudulent
business practices may run the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery.”42
33. Id. (quoting People v. McKale, 602 P.2d 731, 735 (Cal. 1979)).
34. See, e.g., Metro Publ’g, Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 861 F. Supp.
870, 881 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (dismissing a UCL claim based on alleged trademark
infringement and dilution because the plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of showing
that its alleged trademark was highly distinctive and well known as required by
California’s anti-dilution statute); Lee v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto Club, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 798, 810 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that actions that fall within the business
judgment rule are not forbidden by law and cannot constitute an unlawful business
practice).
35. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527,
541 (Cal. 1999).
36. Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660,
668 (Cal. 1983).
37. Id. (“Any violation of the false advertising law, moreover, necessarily violates
the unfair competition law.”).
38. Id.
39. Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 494–95 (Ct. App. 2003).
40. Id. at 494.
41. Id.
42. People ex rel. Mosk v. Nat’l Research Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (1962)
(holding that the UCL is not void for vagueness and that determining what constitutes

1840

BLACKSTON.DOC

[VOL. 41: 1833, 2004]

8/21/2019 3:48 PM

California’s Unfair Competition Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The language of California’s UCL fails to provide any guidance as to
what business practices will be deemed “unfair” as opposed to unlawful
or fraudulent. The legislature has given courts the task of deciding ex
post whether a practice falls within the purview of the unfairness
component.43 In cases of unfair acts amongst competitors, the California
Supreme Court has defined unfair as “conduct that threatens an incipient
violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of
those laws.”44 The state’s high court, however, has expressly declined to
define what acts will be deemed unfair within the consumer context.45
California’s appellate courts have generally held that an act will be
found to be unfair by weighing the utility of the defendant’s conduct
against the gravity of the harm alleged to the victim46 or by determining
whether the alleged unfair act offends an established public policy or is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious
to consumers.47 The California Supreme Court disapproved of both of
these definitions in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles
Cellular Telephone Co., stating that they were “too amorphous and
provide too little guidance . . . .”48 Nonetheless, the court did not
delineate the types of business practices that would be deemed unfair
where injury to consumers is alleged.49

unfair competition is a question of fact). The essential test in determining whether a
given practice is unfair is whether “the public is likely to be deceived.” Id.
43. See, e.g., Barquis, 496 P.2d at 817.
[T]he section was intentionally framed in its broad, sweeping language,
precisely to enable judicial tribunals to deal with the innumerable ‘“new
schemes which the fertility of man’s invention would contrive.”‘ [Am.
Philatelic Soc’y v. Claibourne, 46 P.2d 135, 140 (Cal. 1935).] ‘When a scheme
is evolved which on its face violates the fundamental rules of honesty and fair
dealing, a court of equity is not impotent to frustrate its consummation because
the scheme is an original one. . . .” [Id.]
Id. at 830.
44. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544
(Cal. 1999).
45. Id. at n.12.
46. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234
(Ct. App. 1996).
47. People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 177 (Ct.
App. 1984).
48. Cel-Tech Communications, 973 P.2d at 543.
49. Id. at 544 n.12.
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2. Public Prosecutors and Private Litigants
California’s UCL empowers two broad categories of plaintiffs: public
prosecutors and private litigants.50 The statutory scheme of the UCL
confers greater authority to public prosecutors who, unlike their private
counterparts, may seek civil penalties. Public prosecutors are also given
a monitoring role in private litigant UCL actions where application of
section 17200 is at issue before a court of appeal.51
Prior to passage of Proposition 64, the UCL conferred standing to
“any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general
public.”52 A private party was not required to have suffered a harm to
bring what was commonly called a “private attorney general” action on
behalf of the public.53 The law’s broad standing provision prompted the
Practicing Law Institute to claim that the proper question under the UCL
was not who may file a section 17200 action but “who may not?”54 This
was an apt question given that whenever the legislature had amended the
law, it “ha[d] done so only to expand its scope, never to narrow it.”55
In short, under the previous language of section 17204, “a private
plaintiff who ha[d] himself suffered no injury at all [could] sue to obtain
relief for others.”56 Furthermore, a private attorney general was not
required to show that the defendant’s act caused harm to anyone, but
merely had to demonstrate that the “alleged unfair practices . . . are likely

50. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 1997). The section provides for two
classes of plaintiffs that can bring a UCL action. The first class is the public attorney
general. “Actions for any relief pursuant” to the state’s UCL can be brought by the
Attorney General or any district attorney. Id. Any full-time city attorney may also file
an unfair competition claim as long as she has the consent of the district attorney. Id.
Similarly, upon agreement with the district attorney, county counsel may file a UCL
action for violation of a county ordinance. Id. The second class includes “any person
acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public.” Id.
51. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17209 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004). If a UCL
violation is alleged or application of the UCL is before a Court of Appeal, “the person
who commenced that proceeding shall serve notice thereof . . . on the Attorney
General . . . and on the district attorney of the county in which the lower court action or
proceeding was originally filed.” Id.
52. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 1997). “Persons” are defined as
“natural persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, associations
and other organizations of persons.” Id. § 17201.
53. See Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660,
668–69 (Cal. 1983) (“Allegations of actual deception, reasonable reliance, and damage
are unnecessary. The court may also order restitution without individualized proof of
deception, reliance, and injury” if such a remedy is needed to prevent or stop an unfair
practice.).
54. STRICKLAND ET AL., supra note 29, at 541.
55. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1097 (Cal.
1998).
56. Id. at 1091.
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to deceive . . . .”57 Upholding the policy of the UCL was in essence public
domain, and it could be “vindicated by multiple parties . . . under the broad
standing provision of . . . section 17204.”58
3. Restorative and Preventive Remedies
The UCL remedies are in equity. The theory behind the UCL’s broad
standing provision was to allow the general public to enjoin unfair
competitive acts but limit remedies in order to discourage fraudulent
suits. “A lot of actors can sue, so the courts will get the cases. But
excessive, spurious, and duplicative cases will not be generated because
the remedies are substantially prospective, and there is no (or uncertain)
allowance for attorneys’ fees, even if the plaintiff prevails.”59 This theory,
unfortunately, proved false. Spurious suits proliferated because the UCL’s
broad standing provision, permitting just about anyone to allege unlawful,
fraudulent or unfair acts, made it possible for unscrupulous plaintiffs to
extort settlements without having to demonstrate a colorable claim.
The express language of the UCL remedies provision includes both a
restorative and a preventive element. The court is given the power to
enjoin unfair competitive acts, as well as to “make such orders or
judgments . . . as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment . . .
of any practice which constitutes unfair competition . . . .”60 The sole
monetary remedy under the UCL is restitution.61
57. Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cal. 1979) (“[O]ur concern
with thwarting unfair trade practices has been such that we have consistently condemned
not only those alleged unfair practices which have in fact deceived the victims, but also
those which are likely to deceive them.”).
58. Rubin v. Green, 847 P.2d 1044, 1054 (Cal. 1993). “[T]he courts have
repeatedly permitted persons not personally aggrieved to bring suit for injunctive relief
under the unfair competition statute on behalf of the general public, in order to enforce
other statutes under which parties would otherwise lack standing.” Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. Fisher Dev., Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 151, 155 (Ct. App. 1989).
59. Robert C. Fellmeth, Unfair Competition Act Enforcement by Agencies,
Prosecutors, and Private Litigants: Who’s on First?, 15 CAL. REG. L. REP. 1, 6 (1995)
[hereinafter Who’s on First?].
60. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 1997).
61. While anyone can bring an UCL claim to enjoin a business from engaging in
unfair competition or restore those injured by the practice, individuals may not recover
damages. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 552–53 (Cal. 1992). The
Court of Appeal had permitted disgorgement via fluid recovery funds in representative
UCL claims. See People v. Thomas Shelton Powers, M.D., Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 40
(Ct. App. 1992), overruled in part by Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718
(Cal. 2000); People v. Parkmerced Co., 244 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled
in part by Kraus, 999 P.2d 718. However, in 2000, the California Supreme Court
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Prior to Proposition 64, a court could order restitution without proof of
individualized reliance if the court determined that such a remedy was
necessary to “deter future violations of the unfair trade practice statute
and to foreclose retention by the violator of its ill-gotten gains.”62 The
goal of deterring violations of the UCL had been deemed so important
that the legislature “authorized courts to order restitution without
individualized proof of deception, reliance, and injury if necessary to
prevent the use or employment of an unfair practice.”63 Orders compelling
restitution under the UCL require the defendant to return money acquired
through an unfair business practice to persons in interest from whom the
property was taken.64
The UCL itself does not provide for attorney’s fees, but fees were
often awarded in private attorney general actions pursuant to the
California Code of Civil Procedure. The applicable section allows a
court to award attorneys fees in “the enforcement of an important right
affecting the public interest” to a successful party where “a significant
benefit . . . has been conferred on the general public or a large class of
persons.”65

effectively removed the option of nonrestitutionary disgorgement and fluid recovery
from the possible monetary UCL remedies in representative private attorney general
actions by strictly construing the UCL as expressly authorizing restitution as the only
monetary remedy. Kraus, 999 P.2d at 726.
62. Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 55 (Cal. 1979). Nevertheless,
while restitution is intended to deter future improper conduct in the absence of a
measurable loss, the UCL does not allow the imposition of a monetary sanction merely
to achieve a deterrent effect. Day v. AT&T Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 64 (Ct. App.
1998).
63. Prata v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 302 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Committee on Children’s Television Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668 (Cal.
1983).
64. See Day v. AT&T Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 64 (Ct. App. 1998); cf. Burt v.
Danforth, 742 F. Supp. 1043, 1053–54 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that a shareholder’s
claim for restoration of all remuneration paid to board members did not constitute
restitution within the meaning of California’s Unfair Competition Law because any
remuneration that individual board members received was for their services and was not
acquired by means of the alleged fraudulent acts). Similarly, a consumer who had not
paid allegedly unfair finance and interest charges was not permitted to seek individual
restitution because there was nothing for the court to restore. Prata, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
304.
65. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2004); see also Nestande v. Watson, 4
Cal. Rptr. 3d 18, 23 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that “attorney fees may be recovered by a
private party who acts to enforce laws that public agencies are . . . unwilling to
enforce”); Punsly v. Ho, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 97 (Ct. App. 2003) (providing that private
attorney general fees may be awarded to individual parties as well as corporate and
governmental parties).
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B. Policy Development
1. Protecting Consumers
California’s UCL was arguably the broadest statutory scheme in the
nation to fight market abuses.66 Though initially a statutory remedy for
torts committed against competing businesses, California’s UCL is now
primarily directed toward protecting aggrieved consumers by providing
a means to prevent or enjoin unscrupulous business practices.67 The
California Supreme Court has stated that the primary goal of the UCL is
to protect the consuming public.68
Since the decision of Barquis v. Merchants Collections Ass’n, which
broadened both the UCL’s “standing provision and [the] conduct falling
within its ambit,”69 section 17200 has been used to combat a variety of
unlawful or unfair business practices that have harmed consumers.70
66. Conundrums, supra note 13, at 239–49. Of the states with unfair competition
statutes similar to California none “gives private attorney general status to any person
without qualification.” Id. at 248. Other state statutes allow punitive and treble damages,
whereas California limits damages to injunction and restitution. Id. at 247. For a
plaintiff to file “for others similarly situated,” many states require the plaintiff meet some
of the traditional class action certification standards, notably adequate representation and
notice to absent class members. Id. at 247–48. California’s UCL and similar statutes in
other states have been influenced by the analogous Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (2000). Who’s on First?, supra note 59, at 3. While the California UCL and its
federal counterpart both seek to eliminate unfair competition, the two statutes are enforced
in significantly different ways. California has no administrative agency equivalent to the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and in California private citizens have a right to seek
enforcement of the UCL on behalf of a representative class. Id.
67. For a synopsis of the UCL’s legislative history, see Kraus, 999 P.2d at 727 and
Who’s on First?, supra note 59, at 2–3. The state’s UCL originated in 1872 and over a
century the statute “evolved through amendment and developing caselaw . . . .” Id. at 2.
As the law evolved “it became a means to vindicate consumer or public market
abuses . . . .” Id.
68. See Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass’n, 496 P.2d 817, 829 (Cal. 1972) (“We
conclude that in a society which enlists a variety of psychological and advertising
stimulants to induce the consumption of goods, consumers, rather than competitors, need
the greatest protection from sharp business practices.”). Id.
69. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1107 (Cal.
1998) (Brown, J., dissenting).
70. The broad concept of unfair competition has been applied to violations of the
Penal Code, California’s endangered species laws, the Health and Safety Code, the
Labor Code, the Civil Code, the Public Resources Code, and violations of federal law.
THOMAS A. PAPAGEORGE & ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CALIFORNIA WHITE COLLAR CRIME
§ 3.2221 (2d ed. 2003). The UCL also “sweeps within its scope acts and practices not
specifically proscribed by any other law.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 249 (Cal.
2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
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Examples include enjoining a lender from using personal property as
collateral in loans for the purchase of used cars71 and ending a cigarette
manufacturer’s use of a cartoon character that “improperly target[ed]
minors, and [sought] to make cigarette smokers of them.”72 Barquis
itself is an example of how the UCL protects consumers from unfair
practices. In that case, a private representative action enjoined a collection
agency’s practice of filing lawsuits in improper counties as a means to
better its chances of receiving default judgments.73
Despite the recent emphasis on consumer protection, businesses still
often use the UCL to enjoin unfair practices by their competitors. In
Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc., an unsuccessful
bidder for a Navy contract sought to enjoin a competitor’s alleged
practice of “obtaining Navy contracts through low bids and costs
achieved by improper disposal of hazardous wastes . . . .”74 While there
was an immediate benefit to the plaintiff—not losing business to an
unfair player in the market—plaintiff’s action necessarily resulted in a
public benefit as well, preventing improper disposal of hazardous waste.
2. Unfair Competitive Acts
A common policy justification for California’s UCL is to avoid the socalled “race to the bottom” or “lowest common denominator” problem.
When unfair or unlawful acts go unchecked and the offender is allowed
to benefit from the acts, a competitor’s only recourse more often than
not is to respond with “more extensive abuse in order to preserve market
share, which in turn leads the initiator to further abuse.”75
Take for example the advertising industry, where unchecked false
advertising could cause an industry to degenerate to such an extent that it
is no longer beneficial for an advertiser to tell the truth.76 In an industry
71. Hernandez v. Atl. Fin. Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. 279, 290 (Ct. App. 1980).
72. Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 74 (Cal. 1994).
73. Barquis, 496 P.2d at 819, 831.
74. Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 805, 808
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that defendant’s alleged conduct fell within the UCL and that
the plaintiffs had standing to sue in federal court under section 17200 because the
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an injury in losing the Navy contracts to the
competitor).
75. Conundrums, supra note 13, at 250. Many unfair or unlawful acts by a given
competitor may confer a competitive advantage on the offender. This in turn leads to a
downward spiral where others in the industry seek to obtain the advantage obtained
through unfair acts. Unless the marketplace or a public body creates a “counterforce,”
there is little to prevent the industry from adopting the unfair practice as a norm. This
danger is especially prevalent in industries where there is not a repeat business dynamic
and where consumers are unable to judge standards of performance on their own. Id. at
249–50.
76. False or misleading advertising claims are typically brought under CAL. BUS. &
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of lies, the consumer will not be able to distinguish truths, and the
product advertised will not reap the benefits of truth telling. However,
before the public becomes inured to the falsities and simply stops
believing all ads, there will be consumers who believe the half truths and
are thereby harmed.77 The UCL attempts to avoid private injury due to
unfair competitive acts and stem the “race to the bottom” by providing
an immediate remedy for the injury, as well as a mechanism to prevent
future occurrences of the unfair business practice. However, the UCL’s
inherent due process problems made it difficult to achieve these policy
goals.
3. Politics of Reform
At least eleven reform bills were introduced in 2003 to address the
problems stemming from the UCL.78 Proposals included broadening the
PROF. CODE § 17500 et seq. However, section 17500 and section 17200 claims are often
brought in conjunction by a plaintiff acting as a private attorney general. See, e.g., Day
v. AT&T Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 57, 59 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a private
attorney general action which seeks to enjoin misleading practicing in the advertising of
rates and seeks no monetary discovery falls outside of the federal filed rate doctrine and
can proceed under sections 17200 and 17500). Included in the definition of unfair
competition is “deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
17200 (West 1997). The standard for bringing a successful section 17500 claim is not
whether a consumer has actually been misled, but whether the advertisement is likely to
deceive. Day, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61 (stating that a UCL action may proceed if the
language used is likely to deceive, mislead, or confuse); see also STRICKLAND ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 568–69.
77. In the advertising context, a number of issues arise when applying section
17200. For one, the cost of the individual injury is not easy to discern. Would the
consumer not have bought the product but for the false advertising, or would the
consumer still have been willing to buy the product but only for a lesser amount? The
answer to this question will determine the proper amount of restitution due the consumer.
In a mass market climate, it is reasonable to assume that where there is one injury there
are likely to be many. How should the collective cost be assessed? What if the other
consumers who have been injured do not come forward to be restored? Should the false
advertiser be allowed to reap the benefits of his false claims because injured parties have
not bothered to file a complaint? If so, how can future unfair competitive acts be
deterred? If not, what is the court to do with the disgorged profits? More importantly,
who should have the right to seek a remedy for the aggrieved absent consumers? Should
the duty belong to an individual consumer, whose primary interest is being made whole?
Should the duty belong to a public prosecutor whose interest is arguably to right wrongs
but due to time constraints and political factors may not be in a position to take action on
the unfair competition claim? For further discussion, see Conundrums, supra note 13, at
249–76.
78. Jeff Chorney, L.A. Attorneys at Center of 17200 Debate Could Lose Their Bar
Cards, S.F. RECORDER, Mar. 14, 2003, at 1, available at WL 3/14/2003 RECORDER-SF
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UCL remedies,79 requiring notification of public prosecutors when a
private litigant brings a representative section 17200 claim,80 and requiring
plaintiffs to have suffered harm and demonstrate typicality of claims
before filing a representative action.81 Nonetheless, the legislature failed
to enact section 17200 reform.82 The legislature’s inability to reach
consensus on UCL reform was not new. Numerous proposals, including
procedural improvements suggested by the California Law Revision
Commission in 1996, have not survived committee.83
In 1998, California Supreme Court Justice Janice Rogers Brown
encouraged legislators to summon the “political will” to draft changes to
the state’s UCL and urged more restrictive UCL standing requirements
as a good start.84 Justice Brown suggested that the inertia preventing
reform was the result of an unwillingness of two “politically potent and
contentious groups” to allow a change in the “balance of advantage
between . . . those who sue under the Law, and those who defend.”85
Indeed, political jockeying in 2003 also halted attempts to amend the
law.86
III. ABUSES AND DUE PROCESS
A. Common Abuses
There have generally been three common types of abuses committed
1. Many of the reform bills were drafted in response to the abuses committed by Trevor
Law Group. Id.
79. See S.B. 122, 2003–04 S. (Cal. 2003). The proposal to broaden the UCL
remedies by expressly providing for fluid recovery in representative claims was later
removed from the bill’s language.
80. A.B. 69, 2003–04 Assemb. (Cal. 2003).
81. A.B. 102, 2003–04 Assemb. (Cal. 2003).
82. Jeff Chorney, For Plaintiffs Bar, A Mixed Bag; Despite Last-Minute Setbacks,
Consumer Attorneys Grab a Few Goodies, S.F. RECORDER, Sept. 15, 2003, at 1,
available at WL 9/15/2003 RECORDER-SF 1.
83. See Unfair Competition Litigation Recommendation, 26 CAL. L. REVISION
COMM’N REPORTS 191, 217–26 (1996) [hereinafter Unfair Competition Litigation]. The
Law Revision Commission proposals to implement adequate plaintiff standards, notice
requirements for filing and settlements of judgment, as well as a preference to public
prosecutors, has been included in various bills. For examples of bills that incorporated
aspects of the 1996 Law Revision Commission recommendations prior to the 2003–2004
Legislative Session, see S.B. 593 (Morrow, 1999–2000 Session); A.B. 2511 (Morrow,
1997–1998 Session); A.B. 1295 (Caldera, 1997–1998 Session).
84. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1115 (Cal.
1998) (Brown, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. See Jeff Chorney, Plaintiffs Bar Drops Fight for Disgorgement, S.F. RECORDER,
Sept. 5, 2003, at 1, available at WL 9/5/2003 RECORDER-SF 1. Much of the contention
was between trial lawyers, who sought to reinstate a UCL disgorgement remedy and tort
reformers who proposed doing away with private attorney general actions. Id.
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by plaintiffs in UCL litigation. The abuses continued because section
17200 did not require court review of UCL claims or settlements. While
it is possible that a plaintiff will receive attorney fees and costs for
successful UCL claims, the lure of attorney fees alone did not spawn
UCL abuse. Rather, it was the possibility of mass settlement demands
combined with a lack of court review that led to section 17200 abuse.
1. Divide and Conquer
Plaintiffs could use the UCL to extort money from defendants via a
process of divide and conquer. The Attorney General’s action against the
Orange County law firm for filing frivolous lawsuits against nail salons
illustrates this tactic. According to the Attorney General’s brief, after
filing a UCL complaint which named one defendant accompanied by
500 “Does,” the firm directly contacted individual nail salons with an offer
of settlement. The settlement proposal first threatened a lawsuit, the cost
of which could exceed $10,000. The settlement letter then offered to
“compromise” the action and release the defendant from “all claims” for
a “consideration” of $1000. For good measure, the firm threw in an
expediency clause, noting that if the defendant did not act fast, discovery
would soon commence and the cost of settlement would rise to $2500.87
A defendant’s quick cost-benefit analysis, which may or may not have
included the cost of investigating the merits of the claim, would likely
yield the conclusion that paying off the firm would be the simplest and
cheapest solution. Under the pre Proposition 64 language of the UCL,
an unscrupulous plaintiff held all the cards. By playing divide and
conquer, such plaintiffs could take advantage of two important factors.
First, the plaintiffs could file representative actions against an extraordinary
number of defendants without having to worry about a reciprocal
defendant class because the UCL contains no notice requirement. Public
prosecutors and the defendant recipients of the settlement offers had no
way of knowing that other defendants were being targeted in the same
manner.88 Secondly, plaintiffs were able to parlay the low cost of filing
87. Complaint at 4, State v. Brar (Cal. Super. Ct., County of Orange, July 8, 2003),
available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2003/03-085.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
88. In re Damian S. Trevor, No. 03-TE-00998-RAH, slip op. at 25–26 (Cal. State
Bar Ct. May 21, 2003). The State Bar Court found that it appeared Trevor Law Group
misused the “Doe” procedures in order to make it difficult for defendants to contact each
other and take advantage of the UCL’s lack of notice provisions:
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numerous claims under the UCL’s broad standing provision with threats
of expensive litigation and restitution exposure against many defendants.
This combination allowed plaintiffs to offer low settlement demands that
were likely to be accepted by each individual defendant and still yield
substantive rewards by merely playing the numbers.89
2. Pile On
Along with divide and conquer, the UCL allowed plaintiffs to play “pile
on.” The Trevor Law Group litigation illustrates this problem. Trevor Law
Group found its defendants by preying on actions taken by administrative
agencies. An investigator with the respective regulatory agency sent the
notices of violation to the auto repair shops and restaurants because the
investigator determined that the violation did not merit formal disciplinary
action.90 The purpose of the notice was to inform the business owner
and to seek voluntary compliance with agency regulations.
However, Trevor Law Group used these requests for voluntary
compliance as a means to file UCL claims and then proceeded to play
divide and conquer. The only cost associated with Trevor Law Group’s
investigation of its claims was the brief amount of time it took to peruse
the agency websites. An unharmed plaintiff with private attorney
general status should not have been able to file a case on behalf of the
general public solely to pile on an additional sanction against a defendant
who is in the midst of complying with a regulatory process. In such a
case, the public interest was already being served.

By using the “Doe” procedures . . . [Trevor Law Group attorneys] were able to
keep these identities unknown for a long enough time to allow their aggressive
settlement tactics . . . to take place. The effect of such acts would be to
discourage or prevent other defendants from joining together and retaining
joint defense counsel to litigate their claims.
Id. The lawyers would try to “quickly settle the claims before they were required to
disclose the defendants’ identities; using paralegals to engage in high pressure settlement
tactics; and dismissing defendants who demurred in the lawsuits, sometimes naming
them again in later cases.” Id. at 5.
89. The Attorney General estimated the alleged Brar & Gamulin abuse had the
potential to net approximately $1.5 million in costs and attorney fees. See Complaint at
4, Brar (Cal. Super. Ct., County of Orange, July 8, 2003).
90. In re Trevor, No. 03-TE-00998-RAH, at 20. The Bureau of Automotive
Repair issued the notice of violations when it determined that no formal disciplinary
action was warranted. Trevor Law Group, rather than investigating the merits of their
claims, used the limited information posted on the Bureau website as the basis for its
section 17200 lawsuits. Id. Similarly, the notices issued to the restaurant defendants by
the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services entailed minor violations where
the department still gave the establishment a high letter grade of “A” or “B”. Id. at 32.
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3. Tacking On
A third common area of abuse under the UCL was the practice of
“tacking on” section 17200 claims in an effort to broaden a plaintiff’s
scope of discovery and increase settlement leverage.91 A plaintiff with
an individual and distinct complaint against a single defendant would
almost be foolish not to have taken advantage of the UCL’s broad
standing provision if the opportunity arose. A plaintiff merely needed to
find an alleged “unfair” practice of the defendant that affects a number
of people, and the plaintiff was transformed from a private party suing
on one’s own behalf into a private attorney general suing on behalf of
the public. The transformation gave unscrupulous plaintiffs a powerful
artifice for broadening discovery and extorting settlements.
A problem that often arose in such a scenario was that the concern for
the “public interest” disappeared as soon as the individual plaintiff’s
interests were met.92 In some settlement scenarios the plaintiff could
compromise the public interest in order to better benefit his own. That
is, the plaintiff could lower the cost of the UCL restitution remedy,
which would apply to absent plaintiffs, in exchange for an increase in
damages for his personal claim.93 If the defendant was amenable, a
bargain that compromises the public interest would likely stand because
section 17200 did not require judicial review of settlements based on
private attorney general actions.94

91. Trevor Law Group employed this tactic and routinely threatened UCL
defendants with audits or reviews of their business records, which they claimed would
reveal more violations and cost defendants more money to settle. Id. at 28.
92. See Jan T. Chilton & William L. Stern, California’s Unfair Business Practices
Statutes: Settling the “Nonclass Class” Action and Fighting the “Two-Front War”, 12
CIV. LITIG. REP. 95, 96 (1990).
93. Id.
For plaintiffs, [section 17200] claims offer many of the attractions of class
actions, including the threat of classwide relief, but without the drawbacks of
true class actions. A plaintiff, permitted to assert claims of absent persons,
may be tempted to settle those claims by taking a larger payment for himself or
herself and a lower payment for the absent persons. This invites “blackmail”
suits, a prospect worsened by the fact that lawyers can sue without the need for
an injured client, eliminating even that modest restraint.
Id.
94. The problem of collusive settlements is exacerbated by the fact that “[c]ourts
understandably tend to sign judgments proffered to them by apparently adverse parties.”
Who’s on First?, supra note 59, at n.102.
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B. Due Process
1. Endless Litigation
A major dilemma with the UCL had been the law’s lack of finality.
When combined with section 17204’s broad standing provision, the lack
of finality created a quagmire of due process problems for both
defendants and absent plaintiffs. While the granting of private attorney
general status gave California residents sweeping authority to fight
market abuses, it also subjected defendants to multiple claims regardless
of whether a previous suit over the same unfair competitive act had
already been resolved by settlement or adjudication.95 On the other
hand, simply granting finality to UCL claims jeopardized the due
process rights of absent plaintiffs who may have had their rights litigated
under section 17200 without ever having the opportunity to ensure their
rights were adequately protected.96
Unlike class action litigation, pre Proposition 64 UCL actions did not
provide finality. Thus, another party could bring forth a UCL action
against the same defendant regarding the exact same unfair competitive
act.97 Principles of equity may have given finality to a claim where the
victims had been restored because estoppel will not permit double
recovery.98 But in cases such as Trevor Law Group, where settlements
95. See Chilton & Stern, supra note 92, at 97–100.
96. See Bronco Wine Co. v. Frank A. Logoluso Farms, 262 Cal. Rptr. 899, 910–11
(Ct. App. 1989) (holding that an award of restitution on behalf of twenty-seven absent grape
farmers denied the absent plaintiffs their right to notice and opportunity to be heard).
97. Part[ies] will be collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue only if: “(1) the
issue decided in a prior adjudication is identical with that presented in the action in
question; and (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against
whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.”
Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1105 n.5 (Cal. 1998)
(Baxter, J., concurring) (quoting Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098, 1101–02
(Cal. 1978)). However, a defendant in a subsequent UCL representative action on behalf
of the general public will be hard pressed to prove that the subsequent plaintiff was in
privity with the prior plaintiff. A Court of Appeal decision holding that collateral
estoppel barred a subsequent UCL action by Los Angeles residents suing manufacturers
and distributors for violating the Toxic Enforcement Act was ordered depublished. A
San Francisco based nonprofit corporation had filed a similar claim four months prior.
The Court of Appeal had reasoned that the Los Angeles and San Francisco plaintiffs
were in privity because they were both bringing the representative action on behalf of the
California general public. See Am. Int’l Indus. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815,
824 (Ct. App. 1999) (ordered depublished). For additional discussion, see Scott C.
Lascari, Res Judicata and California’s Unfair Competition Law, LOS ANGELES LAWYER,
Apr. 2003, at 20.
98. See Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 746 (Cal. 2000)
(Werdegar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A remedial order requiring
defendant to restore funds gained through unfair competition forecloses the possibility of
double recovery for restored plaintiffs. Id.
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that would be split between attorneys and a single plaintiff were sought,
subsequent lawsuits could not be estopped because only a single plaintiff
would have been restored.99 Furthermore, even if a defendant successfully
defended a UCL action brought on behalf of the general public, the
defendant could once again find himself defending essentially the same
claim for the same allegedly unfair competitive act despite the prior
litigation.100 This problem was compounded by the fact that virtually
anyone could file a UCL action on behalf of the public interest.
Unlike class action litigation, representative actions under section
17200 did not require superiority, typicality, notice to absent plaintiffs,
the option to opt out, adequate representation, or adequate counsel.101 It
is precisely these safeguards, designed to protect the interests of absent
plaintiffs, that permit courts to grant finality to class action litigation. In
contrast, a representative action on behalf of a specified group of
consumers could have commenced without the affected absent plaintiffs
ever knowing that their “interests” were being litigated.102 As many
courts have noted, representative actions where the alleged victims are
not parties have “serious and fundamental due process deficiencies.”103
2. Disincentives to Settlement
The problems that stemmed from the UCL’s lack of finality were most
acute in the realm of settlements. Instead of creating an incentive to
99. Despite this lack of finality, Trevor Law Group stated that its shell plaintiff,
CEW, promised to release defendants from all claims arising from the alleged
occurrences that led to the section 17200 claim. Furthermore between 70% and 90% of
the settlement fees obtained went to Trevor Law Group’s attorney fees. In re Damian S.
Trevor, No. 03-TE-00998-RAH, slip op. at 27–28 (Cal. State Bar Ct. May 21, 2003).
100. See Stop Youth Addiction, 950 P.2d at 1105 (Baxter, J., concurring).
101. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). For a comparison between class action procedures
and representative actions under the UCL, see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 798 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that for class certification on an
unfair competition theory, the court shall weigh whether formation of a representative
class affords plaintiffs a better opportunity to protect their interests than would an
individual action). “In contrast to the streamlined procedure expressly provided by the
Legislature, the management of a class action is a ‘difficult legal and administrative
task.’” Id. at 799 (citing Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 191 Cal. Rptr. 849, 858 (Ct. App. 1983)).
102. See, e.g., Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d
660 (Cal. 1983); Stop Youth Addiction, 950 P.2d at 1086.
103. Bronco Wine Co. v. Frank A. Logoluso Farms, 262 Cal. Rptr. 899, 911 (Ct.
App. 1989) (“One must question the utility of a procedure that results in a judgment that
is not binding on the nonparty and has serious and fundamental due process deficiencies
for parties and nonparties.”).
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settle, the UCL’s lack of finality frustrated defendants “who [were]
unable to end a dispute they [were] willing to resolve.”104 The lazy
litigation style of Trevor Law Group provides ample reason why a
defendant would be reluctant to settle a representative action with both
private parties and government agencies. If a simple posting of a notice
of violation could proliferate private attorney general action, the
unending litigation that a settlement agreement could bring would be
daunting.105
People v. Cox Cable Communications, Inc., in which three section
17200 claims stemmed from the same alleged unfair act, is such an
example. Cox first agreed to settle a district attorney’s investigation into
the cable company’s alleged practices of issuing excessive late charges.
In return, Cox received assurances from the district attorney that paying
full restitution would preclude private attorney general actions on the
same charges.106 However, shortly before settlement, a private plaintiff’s
firm filed its own section 17200 claim against Cox.107 The cable company
demurred based on the settlement agreement with the district attorney.
The superior court overruled the demurrer, finding that the district
attorney’s office was not in privity with the consumer interest the private
firm represented.108
Without privity, the doctrine of res judicata could not be applied, and
therefore the settlement agreement lacked the stamp of finality that both
the cable company and the district attorney’s office sought.109
Moreover, the private action against Cox lacked finality as well. A few
104. See Who’s On First?, supra note 59, at 7. The lack of finality also causes a
serious “dilemma for public prosecutors and bona fide public interest attorneys
attempting to resolve unfair competition cases; they cannot confer assured finality.” Id.
105. See Chilton & Stern, supra note 92, at 97–100. Absent class certification,
defendants may remain subject to numerous future lawsuits based on the same alleged
unfair competitive act even if the defendant has prevailed in the UCL action. Id. If the
plaintiff prevails, the defendant still remains liable to all of the nonjoined representative
UCL class members who are entitled to a restitution award. Id. The California Supreme
Court declined to address the due process concerns that arise in multiple section 17200
suits against defendants. See Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 733
(Cal. 2000). In Kraus, the defendant’s concern about multiple suits was rendered moot
by the applicable statute of limitations. As a practical matter, the likelihood that any
potential plaintiffs could successfully overcome the applicable statute of limitations and
separately recover judgment against the defendant was too remote to establish denial of
due process concerns. Id.
106. People v. Cox Cable Communications, Inc., No. 679554, slip op. at 3 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1994). For further discussion, see Who’s on First?, supra note 59, at 6–8.
107. Ross v. Cox Cable Communications, Inc., No. 678526 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994).
108. See also People v. Pac. Land Research Co., 569 P.2d 125, 129 (Cal. 1977)
(holding that an action by the public prosecutors lacks fundamental attributes of a class
action filed by a private party because a prosecutor’s role as protector of the public may
be inconsistent with the welfare of the class).
109. Ross, No. 678526 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994).
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months after the court’s refusal to sustain Cox’s demurrer, a second
private plaintiff sued the cable company for the exact same alleged late
charges.110 The UCL’s broad standing provision turned section 17200 into
a source of endless litigation.
Despite obvious disincentives to settle, some defendants have settled
UCL claims, as evidenced by the seventy to eighty settlements Trevor
Law Group obtained. Settling a UCL claim, under the pre Proposition
64 scheme, was not necessarily foolery.111 For one, the likelihood of
subsequent UCL actions may have been miniscule in light of the
applicable four-year statute of limitations.112 Defendants also may have
been able to reduce potential restitution costs by finding a collusive
plaintiff with which to settle and thus avoid litigation by paying off the
plaintiff, while at the same time keeping monies gained from the unfair
practice via a less than adequate restitution remedy.113
IV. THE REFORMS OF PROPOSITION 64
Proposition 64 fundamentally alters California’s UCL. The proposition:
(1) requires representative claims brought by private plaintiffs to comply
with procedural requirements applicable to class action litigation, (2)
authorizes only public prosecutors to sue on behalf of the general public
to enforce unfair business competition laws, and (3) limits an individual’s
110. Preisendorfer v. Cox Cable Communications, Inc., No. 678198 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1994); cf. Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118, 124 (Ct. App. 1997)
(discussing that a private individual, an environmental rights organization, and the
county district attorney were all allowed to bring an unfair competition claim against a
ski resort that refused to abide by an injunctive order).
111. One way to avoid subsequent suits is to include a nonpublicity clause in the
settlement. However, the clauses can be “easily breached without detection” and “the
breach is virtually impossible to remedy.” Chilton & Stern, supra note 92, at 98.
112. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17208 (West 1997); see, e.g., Kraus v. Trinity
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 733 (Cal. 2000).
113. While not necessarily foolery, defendants did take a great risk when settling
representative UCL claims with individual plaintiffs. The ability to settle a UCL suit
“without court approval may appear, at first blush, to be a boon for defendants. If the
plaintiff is not altruistically serving the interests of absent nonclass members, the
defendant may be able to settle for less than if class action procedures were followed.”
Chilton & Stern, supra note 92, at 97. However, “[t]o meet the demands of due process,
the interests of absent parties must be ‘adequately represented’ in the litigation if absent
parties are to be bound by any settlement or judgment in the action.” Id. (quoting
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985)). “Thus, the . . . defendant
may be able to settle with the unharmed plaintiff cheaply, but the defendant buys little or
no peace by such a settlement” because both initial and subsequent plaintiffs are not
required to meet adequate plaintiff standards to bring a representative UCL claim. Id.
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right to sue by allowing private enforcement only if that individual has
been actually injured by, and suffered financial/property loss because of
an unfair business practice.114 Under the proposition, penalties recovered
by the Attorney General or local prosecutors are to be used only for
enforcement of consumer protection laws.115
The measure greatly restricts who can bring an unfair competition
claim and in essence eliminates all private attorney general actions. By
importing the elements of class certification into UCL claims, the
proposition resolves the due process and lack of finality concerns that
had besieged section 17200 actions. As with class certification requirements,
imposing a harm requirement on private UCL actions also limits
standing. Individuals no longer have standing to seek judicial relief
under the UCL by simply crying foul. Rather, they must be harmed
themselves and “establish the existence of an ascertainable class and a
well-defined community of interest among the class members.”116
A. Importing the Procedural Requirements of Class Actions
In order to bring a representative UCL claim on behalf of others,
Proposition 64 requires the plaintiff to establish a section 17200 class.117
Under California Law, formation of a class entails, inter alia,
demonstrating: (1) a predominate question of law or fact, (2) representation
by plaintiffs who have claims typical of the class, and (3) competent
counsel.118 Additionally, in many instances, class formation also
114. See Official Voter Information Guide, California General Election, Nov. 2,
2004. The language of Proposition 64 can be found at the California Secretary of State’s
website, available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop64-title.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2004). See infra note 117 for the actual language of the proposition
pertaining to the class action and harm requirement.
115. See Proposition 164, supra note 114. Proposition 64 amends section 17206 so
that civil penalties collected by public prosecutors in UCL actions “shall be for the
exclusive use by the Attorney General, the district attorney, the county counsel, and the
city attorney for the enforcement of consumer protection laws.” Id.
116. Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 27–28 (Cal. 1981).
117. See Official Voter Information Guide, California General Election, Nov. 2,
2004. The language of Proposition 64 can be found at the California Secretary of State’s
website, available at http://www.voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/prop64-title.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2004). The Proposition amends Section 17203 so that it reads:
Any person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only
if the claimant meets the standing requirements of Section 17204 and complies
with Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but these limitations do not
apply to claims brought under this chapter by the Attorney General, or any
district attorney, county counsel, city attorney, or city prosecutor in this state.
Id. Additionally the amendments to section 17204 state that any person can bring a
UCL claim as long as that person has “suffered injury in fact and has lost money or
property as a result of such unfair competition.” Id.
118. Richmond, 629 P.2d at 28.
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requires notifying absent class members of pending class litigation and
of any settlements stemming from the class action.119 Class action
procedures ensure that representative plaintiffs are competent to litigate
the interests of the absent class members, which in turn assists in
affording defendants the benefit of finality. Furthermore, requiring a
private plaintiff to form a class before alleging a violation of section
17200 on behalf of others similarly situated reduces the potential for
abuse stemming from plaintiffs simply tacking on a UCL claim.
Plaintiffs will no longer be able to gain leverage by purporting to bring
an action on behalf of others unless they can establish before a court that
they are competent to bring forth such a claim.
The goal of the UCL is to provide a “streamlined procedure by which
to challenge unfair business practices”120 and to promote a “policy of
permitting members of the public to police the spectrum of ‘unfair
competition.’”121 It has been argued that class action notice requirements
have the potential to become an obstruction to this streamlined approach.
Under federal and California class action law, plaintiffs are often
required to notify all potential plaintiffs of the pending litigation before
forming a class.122 The “cost of individual notice lessens the usefulness
of class actions in enforcing consumer protection laws” because it acts
as a “considerable deterrent” to filing, especially when the cost of notice
outweighs the potential recovery.123 The California Law Revision
Commission expressly declined to adopt all of the class certification
procedural requirements in its proposal to improve the UCL in large part
because of fears that notice requirements would hinder section 17200

119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(d–e) (West 1998). Although section 1781 is written so
as to be applied to consumer actions, the California Supreme Court has suggested that,
along with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, it be used as a procedural guideline to
ensure fairness in class action lawsuits. Richmond, 629 P.2d at 27 n.7.
120. Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 724 (Cal. 2000).
121. Rubin v. Green, 847 P.2d 1044, 1052 (Cal. 1993).
122. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). “[A]
fundamental requirement of due process” is to provide notice “reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Id. In California class
action litigation, “‘meaningful’ notice by publication may [in some instances] be
sufficient to satisfy [state constitutional] due process” concerns. However, in many
cases California courts are likely to require individual notice as well. James R. McCall
et al., Greater Representation for California Consumers—Fluid Recovery, Consumer
Trust Funds, and Representative Actions, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 797, 805 (1995).
123. McCall, supra note 122, at 806.

1857

BLACKSTON.DOC

8/21/2019 3:48 PM

enforcement.124
However, given California’s liberal class action laws, this fear may
prove to be unfounded. California courts have taken a lenient approach
to class notification procedures and allowed notice by publication when
the class action predominately seeks injunctive relief and the damages
sought per class member are minimal.125 Because the only remedies
available under section 17200 are injunction and restitution, it should
follow that in many representative UCL claims individual notice to
absent plaintiffs may not be required. Additionally, in consumer class
actions, the courts are authorized to shift the burden of the cost of
notification from plaintiffs to defendants.126
Furthermore, under California’s class action law, courts have broad
discretion and may certify a class as one seeking injunctive relief when
the relief sought is predominately prospective and seeks to prevent
future abuses.127 An intermediate appeals court has held that even where
a class action seeks monetary damages, it may be classified as an
injunctive class with its less stringent notice requirements, as long as the
plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief predominates.128 Thus, in Bell v.
American Title Insurance Co., the court approved a class action settlement
and did not require individualized notice to absent class members or the
option to opt out of the class even though the settlement required the
defendant to pay $250,000 in restitution and implement a price rollback
scheme for a period of four years.129 The court expressed a preference
for the injunctive class, noting one commentator’s opinion that the
injunctive class provides res judicata effect as to the entire class because
it does not provide absent class members the opportunity to opt out.130
Recently adopted Rule 1856 of the California Rules of Court provides
guidance for the appropriate notification necessary for absent class members.

124. Unfair Competition Litigation, supra note 83, at 211. The Commission Report
noted that one of the most significant practical distinctions between class actions and
pre-Proposition 64 UCL actions is that representative UCL actions are a “simpler and
cheaper” alternative to class actions because representative plaintiffs are able to avoid
the substantial costs often associated with class action notice requirements. Id. at 207.
125. California courts will require individual mailed notice to class members where
members of the class have a substantial damage claim such that members may decide to
“opt out” of the class and pursue their independent remedies, but when membership in
the class is huge and damages per member minimal, notice by publication may be
adequate. Cooper v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 127 Cal. Rptr. 579, 585 (Ct. App. 1976).
126. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(d) (West 1998).
127. Bell v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 277 Cal. Rptr. 583, 592 (Ct. App. 1991).
128. Id. at 591–94.
129. Id. at 586–87.
130. Id. at 594.
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In determining the manner of notice, the court must consider:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

The interests of the class;
The type of relief requested;
The stake of the individual class members;
The cost of notifying class members;
The resources of the parties;
The possible prejudice to class members who do not receive notice; and
The res judicata effect on class members.131

If the cost of individual notice appears to be prohibitively expensive in
light of the interests of the class members, then the court may order
notice by publication.132
Given the policy goals of the UCL, it is likely that many, if not most,
legitimate section 17200 representative actions will fall within the
injunctive class designation. Such a designation will in turn assist in shaping
the appropriate notification to absent plaintiffs. Undoubtedly, the high
level of judicial discretion permitted in class formation poses the
practical problem of unpredictable results.133 Nevertheless, the benefit
of finality that class certification procedures bring outweighs the burden
of the errant decisions that the passage of Proposition 64 is likely to
breed during its formative years.
B. A Showing of Harm
Proposition 64 requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a cognizable harm
before they may bring a representative claim under section 17200.134 At
first blush, such a limitation on standing would appear to have the potential
to decrease the filing of unmeritorious UCL lawsuits. Additionally, it
seems logical that a person who has been harmed by an alleged unfair
act is more competent to bring a representative action on behalf of
131. CAL. COURT RULES § 1856(e) (West Supp. 2004).
132. Id.
133. “Because the predominance test in this context is dependent on the exercise
of sound discretion by the court, there is little doubt that reasonable courts can
and do reach opposite results under similar circumstances. No clear standards
have been or could be developed to yield more predictable results in this area
so pregnant with judicial discretion.”
Bell, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 592 (quoting HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS 298 (2d ed. 1985)).
134. Under its amendments to section 17204, Proposition 64 requires a plaintiff
bringing a UCL action to have suffered injury in fact and to have lost money or property
as a result of the alleged unfair competition.
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injured consumers similarly situated than someone who has not been
harmed by the unfair act.
However, when combined with the requirements of class certification,
the additional benefits that a harm requirement provides may not be as
great as it would initially appear. For one, a harm requirement can be
easily overcome in many instances. In actions alleging false advertising,
a plaintiff need only purchase the advertised product to demonstrate
harm.135
Secondly, requiring UCL plaintiffs to demonstrate financial injury in
some instances has the potential to undermine section 17200’s policy of
giving the public the power to police unfair competition. For example,
private representative UCL actions brought to enjoin a violation of the
state’s environmental laws are now precluded where a direct harm to the
representative plaintiff cannot be shown even when the violation clearly
falls within the UCL’s unlawful prong. While prosecutors could
certainly bring an action against the violator, the State Attorney General
and the California District Attorneys Association has stated that private
UCL enforcement is a vital supplement to their efforts against illegal
business practices.136 “Although there are within the executive
branch . . . offices and institutions . . . whose function it is to represent
the general public . . . for various reasons the burden of enforcement is
not always adequately carried by those offices and institutions, rendering
some sort of private action imperative.”137 Moreover, private attorney
general actions, such as those brought by consumer groups, played an
important role in curbing market abuse.138
135. For example, plaintiffs could readily have representatives enter defendant nail
salons to get their nails painted in order to create “harmed” plaintiffs for a claim that
using the same bottle of nail polish for more than one customer constitutes an unfair
practice. Complaint at 4, State v. Brar (Cal. Super. Ct., County of Orange, July 8, 2003),
available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2003/03-085.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2004).
136. See Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 738 (Cal. 2000)
(Werdegar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Marc Lifsher, Lockyer
Joins Prop. 64 Fray: The attorney general wants voters to defeat the measure that would
limit the Unfair Competition Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at C2, available at 2004 WL
55940741; Christian Berthelsen, Prop. 64 Would Limit Suits Against Businesses, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 19, 2004, available at 2004 WL 58610943.
137. Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1313–15 (Cal. 1977) (holding attorneys fees
may be awarded in private attorney general actions).
138. Id. at 1313.
Through the UCL a plaintiff may obtain restitution and/or injunctive relief
against unfair or unlawful practices in order to protect the public and restore to
the parties in interest money or property taken by means of unfair competition.
These actions supplement the efforts of law enforcement and regulatory
agencies. This court has repeatedly recognized the importance of these private
enforcement efforts.
Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 725 (Cal. 2000).
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A harm requirement for standing is necessary where a plaintiff seeks
damages, but the UCL’s remedies are limited.139 Injunction and restitution
are directed at preventing future harm. Injunctions stop harmful acts.140
Restitution prevents future unlawful acts by removing the incentive to
commit them.141 The limited remedies available under the UCL, combined
with class certification requirements, temper what had been section
17200’s overbroad standing provision. Under the pre-Proposition 64
scheme, in cases where plaintiffs had suffered little to no harm,
restitution was minimal or nonexistent, and the effect of a representative
UCL action would have been to enjoin an unfair practice before it
harmed the public.
Now that demonstration of actual injury is necessary for individuals to
bring a UCL action, private plaintiffs will have to wait until an injury
occurs before being able to enjoin an unfair practice. In most instances,
this is a sensible result. But it is worth considering the effect on cases
such as Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., where a private attorney
general action enjoined a cigarette manufacturer’s practice of using a
cartoon character, Joe Camel, to advertise cigarettes to teenagers.142 If
the UCL had been saddled with a harm requirement, it would have been
much more difficult to enjoin the ad campaign. Questions such as
“Would a child have to become addicted to cigarettes or be diagnosed
with a tobacco-related illness as an adult in order to bring a UCL
claim?” become paramount.
The creation of a harm requirement may or may not stem UCL abuses.
Certainly, the requirement will assist plaintiffs in demonstrating that
they are adequate representatives to form a section 17200 class.
However, it remains to be seen whether Proposition 64’s creation of a
harm requirement and its subsequent effect of removing a category of
UCL claims from the realm of private enforcement will have a positive
or a deleterious impact on California’s business environment.
139. Cf. Conundrums, supra note 13, at 247. In other states with unfair competition
statutes, plaintiffs may recover damages, as well as punitive or treble damages.
However, in order to have standing to bring an unfair competition claim in those states,
the plaintiff must suffer actual business or personal injury.
140. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 788 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “injunction” as
“court order commanding or preventing an action”).
141. Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cal. 1979). The court stated
that while injunction has some deterrent force, restitution is a necessary remedy in UCL
actions to deter unfair competitive acts. Id.
142. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994).
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V. ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED
Proposition 64 left two important issues concerning the enforcement
of California’s UCL unresolved. The Proposition did not address what
has been the extraordinarily difficult task of defining what constitutes an
unfair, rather than fraudulent or unlawful, business practice. Additionally,
while imposing class action requirements for the enforcement of
representative UCL claims, the Proposition did not touch upon the issue
of fluid recovery. The California Supreme Court has precluded fluid
recovery in section 17200 claims, stating that the legislature has
permitted such relief only in the context of class actions.143 Now that all
representative UCL claims must undergo the rigorous procedures of
class certification, it would seem to follow that that the establishment of
a fluid recovery scheme is permissible.
A. Defining Unfair
It is inherently difficult to predetermine what constitutes an unfair
competitive act because it is impossible to contemplate with any
certainty “the innumerable ‘new schemes which the fertility of man’s
invention would contrive.’”144 Recent judicial decisions have limited the
scope of the UCL’s unfairness prong, making it more difficult to bring
representative private attorney general claims against businesses based
solely on an allegation that a given practice is unfair, rather than
unlawful or fraudulent. However, such a reduction of the UCL’s power
to enjoin unfair competition unnecessarily burdens consumers who may
find themselves without a means to fight unfair business acts.
1. Tethered Argument
In cases of unfair acts amongst competitors, the California Supreme
Court has tethered the section 17200 definition of unfair to “conduct that
threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy
143.

Id.

Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 732 (Cal. 2000).
In sum, the Legislature has not expressly authorized monetary relief other
than restitution in UCL actions, but has authorized disgorgement into a fluid
recovery fund in class actions. Although the Legislature is well aware of the
distinction between class actions and representative actions, it has not done so
for representative actions.

144. Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass’n, 496 P.2d 817, 830 (Cal. 1972) (holding
that by permitting a restraint on all unfair business practices, the UCL establishes a wide
standard to guide courts of equity and the legislature concluded that a less inclusive
standard was not adequate) (quoting Am. Philatelic Soc’y v. Claibourne, 46 P.2d 135,
140 (1935)).
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or spirit of one of those laws.”145 The court expressly stated that the
definition does not apply to unfair acts affecting consumers or to
fraudulent acts affecting competitors.146 Nevertheless, two intermediate
appellate courts have held that when public policy arguments are the
impetus for unfair competition act litigation, the claims must “be ‘tethered’
to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions.”147
Tethering UCL claims to such provisions negates the section’s unfair
component and inappropriately requires unfair competitive acts to be
defined at the expense of consumers.
In Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court, a couple, who had contracted with
a health care organization for medical insurance and had chosen Scripps
as their provider, filed a malpractice claim against two Scripps
physicians.148 In retaliation, Scripps invoked a clause in its contract with
the health care organization that allowed Scripps to refuse service to the
couple and all members of their family. The couple filed a number of
claims against the hospital, including a section 17200 action that alleged
Scripps’ policy, allowing it to refuse medical treatment, was unfair
because “it impedes a patient’s right to seek redress for malpractice in
the courts . . . .”149
The far reaching consequences of Scripps’ action meant that family
members of any patient who filed a malpractice claim against one of
Scripps’ doctors could no longer see any of the 350 Scripps physicians.
This ban on treatment was made without inquiry into the merits of the
malpractice claim and could be overridden only where another medical
145. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544
(Cal. 1999) (holding that the effects of unfair acts amongst competitors are comparable
to or the same as violations of antitrust law).
146. Id. at 544 n.12.
147. See Gregory v. Albertson’s, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 395 (Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that a grocery store’s lease arrangement requiring a nearby location to remain
permanently closed so that no competing groceries could enter the local market was not
an unfair practice because the Health and Safety Code does not call for a “private
remedy affecting a single parcel of property under the unfair competition law”); see also
Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 116 (Ct. App. 2003).
148. Scripps Clinic, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.
149. Id. at 114. Scripps contended that it had not violated the UCL because
“physicians have the right to withdraw from a patient’s care and because patients have
no right to treatment by a particular physician.” Id. The court narrowly construed the
UCL claim as applying to the particular plaintiffs and failed to fully consider the
couple’s representative claim. The court declined to consider Scripps’ policy of
transferring all members of a patient’s family when a patient sues. “Scripps did not
apply that policy in this case because both [individuals in the couple] were plaintiffs in
the malpractice action.” Id. at 118.
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system could not duplicate Scripps’ services and the transfer would not
jeopardize the patient’s care.150 On its face, such a policy seems patently
unfair, albeit not illegal or fraudulent, and worthy of judicial review, not
summary adjudication. However, the court summarily dismissed the
couple’s section 17200 claim because it was premised on public policy
that was not tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
provisions.151
2. Unfair v. Unlawful
The Scripps case demonstrates the problem that arises when section
17200 claims are conditioned upon the business practice being unlawful
or fraudulent. Under the Scripps scheme, the unfair component is no
longer effectual, and section 17200 no longer promotes a “policy of
permitting members of the public to police the spectrum of ‘unfair
competition.’”152 By default, the only public policies that are clearly
tethered to constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions will be
unlawful or fraudulent ones. This means unscrupulous competitive acts
may not be precluded unless the legislature or a regulatory agency has
expressly proscribed them. The first consumer who files a claim against
an unscrupulous business practice that is not fraudulent, unlawful, or
clearly based on the overall scheme of a statute will likely have no
remedy because the public policy behind the section 17200 claim has not
been “tethered.”153 The Scripps case also portends a dramatic race to the
bottom in the healthcare industry. Surely, other medical providers will
150. Id. at 105.
151. Id. at 117. “‘[W]here a claim of an unfair act or practice is predicated on
public policy . . . the public policy which is a predicate to the action must be “tethered”
to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions.’” Id. at 116 (quoting
Gregory, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394). The court did not think the constitutional right of
persons to seek judicial redress without retaliation was an applicable constitutional
predicate. The court stated that the right to seek redress in the courts is a constitutional
right but held that the Scripps’ policy does not interfere with the right to pursue
malpractice claims, but merely “chooses not to treat the litigants once the decision to
litigate has been communicated to Scripps.” Id. at 117.
152. See Rubin v. Green, 847 P.2d 1044, 1052 (Cal. 1993) (stating that private
plaintiff could not avoid bar of statute that provides a privilege for publications made
during judicial proceedings by seeking injunctive relief under section 17204).
153. The benefit of tethering unfair acts based on public policy is that businesses
may predetermine whether a given practice is unfair by looking to laws and regulations
already on the books. The legislature and California’s regulatory agencies would, in
effect, assume a role in determining what acts are unfair. For example, does using one
bottle of nail polish for multiple patrons constitute an unfair business practice? The
regulations promulgated by the Board of Barbering and Cosmetology may provide the
answer. However, it may take agencies years to determine whether a new scheme
constitutes an unfair practice, leaving consumers with little or no immediate relief. For
further discussion see Conundrums, supra note 13, at 236–38.
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implement similar clauses if they prove to be a means to reduce the
number of malpractice claims.
Apart from Scripps, judicial attempts to define “unfair” in consumer
actions have centered around “weigh[ing] the utility of the defendant’s
conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim”154 or
determining whether the alleged unfair act offends an established public
policy or is “immoral, unethical, or oppressive, unscrupulous [or]
whether it causes substantial injury to consumers . . . .”155 These definitions
provide little assistance to businesses seeking to know with reasonable
certainty whether a given practice will be susceptible to private
representative actions. California’s UCL scheme, giving courts the power
to determine what constitutes an unfair practice, has the advantage of
“early detection” and provides a relatively quick means of determining
whether a competitive act is unfair.156 But businesses are given little
guidance in predetermining what may constitute an unfair act.
This lack of certainty presents the converse problem of Scripps, which
is allowing courts to define “unfair” at the expense of businesses.157
154. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234
(Ct. App. 1996); see also Motors, Inc. v. Times-Mirror Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546 (Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate if the utility
of the conduct clearly justifies the practice). An example of a business practice that was
not deemed unfair under the UCL is found in Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (Ct. App. 2002). The court upheld as not unfair a loan agency’s
practice of passing on the $9.50 to $12.00 cost of property inspections to delinquent
borrowers. “There is nothing ‘unethical’ about passing a reasonable cost of protecting
the security to a defaulting borrower.” Id. at 92.
155. People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 177 (Ct.
App. 1984) (citing F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972)).
156. In contrast to California’s UCL, enforcement of the federal unfair competition
act is not left to the courts but is the duty of the Federal Trade Commission. See 15
U.S.C. § 45 (2000). Similar to California’s UCL, the federal counterpart provides a
“generic prohibition” against unfair acts, but a single administrative agency determines
whether a cease and desist order should be issued “against a person or entity committing
unfair acts in competition.” Conundrums, supra note 13, at 236–37. One advantage of
having the FTC adjudicate all federal unfair competition claims is that it gives “clarity”
and “notice” to the marketplace by creating a “system of advance guiding and warning.”
Id. at 237. A marked disadvantage is the “free bite” phenomenon, which may allow a
business to continue an unfair practice for years because no punitive sanction is possible
against the violator until the FTC completes the lengthy bureaucratic process necessary
to issue a cease and desist order. Id.
157. See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527,
543 (Cal. 1999). An undefined standard of what is unfair fails to give businesses
adequate guidelines as to what conduct may be challenged. Furthermore, undefined
standards may lead to arbitrary or unpredictable decisions about what is fair or unfair,
and in some cases “may even lead to the enjoining of pro competitive conduct and
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Such an approach in the consumer context, however, is preferable
because safeguards are in place to ameliorate the painful aftermath that
a business may face when it finds itself on the losing end of a section
17200 test case.158 Though the practice will still be enjoined, the
remedies and civil penalties may be lessened since a trial court has
“very broad” discretion in formulating equitable relief in UCL
actions.159 Whether a practice is tethered to an existing law or policy is
relevant to setting equitable remedies and civil penalties, but should
not determine whether a practice is unfair and should, therefore, be
enjoined.
B. The Role of Fluid Recovery
The balance struck by California’s UCL is between broad liability and
limited relief.160 Under section 17203, monetary relief is limited to
orders “as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any
money or property . . . which may have been acquired by means of . . .
unfair competition.”161 California’s high court has held that section
17200 does not authorize a court to order a defendant to disgorge all
profits gleaned from unfair competition to a plaintiff who does not have
an ownership interest in those profits.162 Additionally, the court has
interpreted section 17203 as not permitting profits obtained from unfair
competitive acts to be disgorged into a fluid recovery fund.163

thereby undermine consumer protection, the primary purpose of the antitrust laws.”
Id.
158. See People v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 202 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Ct. App. 1984). In
setting civil penalties, courts take into account such equity considerations as the need to
deter future misconduct, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, and the
willfulness of the misconduct. In National Ass’n of Realtors, the court held that the
“lack of need to deter” is an appropriate consideration for “setting the amount of the
penalty.” Id. at 248. Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court had erred in
imposing civil penalties without considering the numbers of persons directly affected by
each act of unfair competition, the number of specific unfair acts, the malicious or
predatory nature of the acts, and the degree of harm the acts of unfair competition
actually caused. Id. at 249.
159. See Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 717 (Cal.
2000) (stating that consideration of the equities between the parties is necessary to
ensure an equitable result); cf. People v. Dollar Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 259 Cal. Rptr.
191, 199 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that in a UCL action the trial court properly increased
penalties by imposing civil liability on an individual defendant “[b]ecause of his control
over the policies and procedures followed by defendant corporations”).
160. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 949 (Cal. 2003).
161. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 1997).
162. Korea Supply Co., 63 P.3d at 946.
163. Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 732 (Cal. 2000). For a
definition of fluid recovery see infra note 173.
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1. Nonrestitutionary Disgorgement
Restitution under the UCL is broad enough to allow a plaintiff to
recover money or property in which he or she has a vested interest.164
“Under the UCL, an individual may recover profits unfairly obtained to
the extent that [the] profits represent monies given to the defendant or
benefits in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest.”165 For
example, unpaid wages may be recovered under the UCL because they
“are as much the property of the employee who has given his or her
labor to the employer . . . as is property a person surrenders through an
unfair business practice.”166 In contrast, the commission a broker
expects to receive from landing a deal for a client cannot be restored
under the UCL.167 In such an instance, the broker will be found to have
an expectancy interest in the profits, not an ownership interest.168
Nonrestitutionary disgorgement is not an available remedy under the
UCL.169 Nonrestitutionary disgorgement is best defined as an order to
surrender all profits earned as a result of an unfair business practice
regardless of whether those profits represent money taken directly from
persons who were victims of the unfair practice.170 A prohibition on
nonrestitutionary disgorgement is in keeping with the balance struck by
the UCL between broad liability and limited relief. Plaintiffs should not
be able to rely on the UCL to disgorge defendants of profits in which the
victims of the unfair competitive act have no ownership interest. In such
164. Korea Supply Co., 63 P.3d at 947.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 946 (quoting Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706,
715 (Cal. 2000)).
167. Id. The case involved a broker for a defense contractor that filed an unfair
competition claim against a competitor whose agent had used bribes and sexual favors to
garner a contract with the Republic of Korea. Id. at 942. The broker sought the
competitor’s profits to be disgorged and handed over to the firm.
168. Id. at 947. The Korea Supply court held that the UCL does not permit
disgorged profits to be awarded to an individual plaintiff who has no ownership interest
in the profits. Id. at 946. Further, the court stated that allowing the transfer of disgorged
profits in individual actions where the plaintiff has no ownership interest would
improperly turn the UCL into “an all-purpose substitute” for tort claims over intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage. Id. at 948. “Allowing the plaintiff in
this case to recover nonrestitutionary disgorgement under the UCL would enable it to
obtain tort damages while bypassing the burden of proving elements of liability under its
traditional tort claim.” Id. The court held that individual competitors should have quick
access to the judiciary to enjoin unfair competition, but monetary remedies should be
strictly limited to restitution. Id.
169. Id. at 949.
170. Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718, 725 (Cal. 2000).
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instances, any disgorgement of those profits is better described as an
award for damages.
However, it must be noted that in some cases this limitation on
remedies will undermine the deterrent prong of the UCL and potentially
permit unjust enrichment. For example, in Southwest Marine, Inc. v.
Triple A Machine Shop, Inc., discussed supra, where an unsuccessful
bidder for a Navy contract brought a claim against a competitor for
allegedly cutting bid costs by improperly disposing hazardous waste, the
bidder’s only remedy under the UCL would be an injunction.171 Under
the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the UCL, the bidder has
no interest in the profits that the competitor received from unfairly
obtaining the contract and, therefore, is not entitled to restitution.
Limiting relief to enjoining the competitor’s improper disposal of
hazardous waste arguably gives the competitor a free bite at achieving
one-time profits through illegal means. There is little incentive for a
business to stop cutting costs by improperly disposing waste when the
only repercussion a competitor’s UCL claim will bring is a court order to
stop the practice. Nonetheless, the UCL does not operate in a vacuum
and, as in Southwest Marine where the plaintiff sought treble damages
under an applicable federal statute, plaintiffs need not rely solely on
section 17200 for relief.172
2. Fluid Recovery
In Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc., the California Supreme
Court held that establishment of a fluid recovery fund as a form of cy
pres relief is not a proper remedy under the UCL.173 The decision is not
171. Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 805, 808
(N.D. Cal. 1989).
172. Id.
173. Directly translated, cy pres means “as near as.” It is an equitable doctrine that
is often used in “construing charitable gifts when the donor’s original charitable purpose
cannot be fulfilled.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (7th ed. 1999). That is, “where
funds cannot be delivered precisely to those with primary legal claims, the money should
if possible be put to the ‘next best’ use.” Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1522 (1976).
“The term ‘fluid recovery’ refers to the application of the equitable doctrine of cy
pres in the context of a modern class action. [State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715
P.2d 564, 570 (Cal. 1986).] ‘The implementation of fluid recovery involves
three steps. [Citation.] First, the defendant’s total damage liability is paid over
to a class fund. Second, individual class members are afforded an opportunity
to collect their individual shares by proving their particular damages, usually
according to a lowered standard of proof. Third, any residue remaining after
individual claims have been paid is distributed by one of several practical
procedures that have been developed by the courts. [Levi Strauss & Co., 715
P.2d at 571.]”
Kraus, 999 P.2d at 725 (quoting Granberry v. Islay Invs., 889 P.2d 970, 977).
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in keeping with the broad liability and limited relief envisioned by the
UCL. It also has the potential to render ineffectual an entire class of
section 17200 claims where plaintiffs bring a representative action on
behalf of consumers who are not easily located. Moreover, establishment of
a fluid recovery fund assists in alleviating the due process concerns of
defendants and absent plaintiffs.
In Kraus, tenants of a rental agency, which owned approximately
2000 residential units in San Francisco, brought a representative UCL
action against the agency’s practice of wrongfully requiring nonrefundable
security deposits.174 The plaintiff sought to disgorge the profits the
agency illegally obtained from absent tenants into a fluid recovery
fund.175 The court held that section 17203 did not authorize fluid recovery
and directed the trial court to order the defendants to use “all reasonable
means” to “identify, locate, and repay” each former tenant.176 In other
words, the rental agency had to restore, that is, pay back, only the former
tenants it could find with reasonable effort.
In dissent, Justice Kathryn Werdegar complained that the majority’s
decision allowed the rental agency to keep nearly a half million dollars
in “illegal gains from unfair competition.”177 She claimed the majority’s
decision also made the preventative component of the UCL ineffectual
by potentially permitting defendants to retain a portion of illicit profits
and thereby impair the UCL’s deterrent force.178 Moreover, requiring
UCL defendants to restore only those victims they can find is an
awkward and costly endeavor. It provides defendants with an incentive
not to find victims, and in the mass market context such a scheme is
wasteful. It requires defendants to incur the exorbitant cost of notifying
injured consumers only to make comparatively meager individual
restitution payments.179
174. Kraus, 999 P.2d at 722–24.
175. Id. at 722.
176. Id. at 732.
177. Id. at 736.
178. See id. at 737; cf. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458
F.2d 1082, 1103–05 (2d Cir. 1972) (indicating that the deterrent effect of an SEC
enforcement action would be greatly undermined if securities law violators did not
disgorge illicit profits into a trust fund).
179. Given the facts of Kraus, such an order could be found reasonable because the
deposits were $100 and the defendant could reasonably be expected to have some record
of the whereabouts of its former tenants. However, generally requiring UCL defendants
to locate their potential adversaries is neither an effective nor efficient means of ensuring
that defendants do not benefit from, or are unjustly punished for, their unfair business
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Fluid recovery does not present double recovery and due process
concerns for defendants as the defendant in Kraus claimed.180 Quite the
contrary, it assists in bringing finality to UCL claims and precludes
multiple payouts for a single injury because the entire restitution owed is
determined in one lump sum rather than piecemealed based on the class
the plaintiff purports to represent. A defendant’s total liability is paid over
to a fluid recovery fund, and individual members of the representative
class are restored. The residue is calculated and deposited into a trust
fund over which the trial court will retain jurisdiction. If subsequent
plaintiffs file representative UCL claims over the same acts, “no court
entertaining such action could award additional disgorgement because,
by virtue of the [prior judgment], defendants would have given up all
their ill-gotten gains and, as a matter of law, would have nothing left to
disgorge.”181
Subsequent successful claims for restitution would be directed to the
trust fund. The fund would remain in place until the applicable statute of
limitations has run. Depending on court order or agreement between the
parties, any funds remaining after the expiration of the statute of
limitations could be handled in one of a variety of ways. The residual
funds would escheat to a state agency or be handed over to consumer
groups active in protecting the interests of the representative class.182 In
the alternative, the funds could be returned to the defendant who would
then be required to issue a corresponding price rollback.
3. Restitution Provisions
The legislature should intervene to clarify the available monetary
remedies in UCL actions by carefully defining restitution, so as not to be
confused with nonrestitutionary disgorgement, and expressly providing
for fluid recovery. Such a provision should include the following:
practices. In instances where small amounts of individual restitution are owed, while a
business has reaped large gains from unfair competitive acts, locating potential plaintiffs
may be cost prohibitive. For example, a retailer that shortchanged customers could find
restitution costs prohibitive if not impossible. The cost could easily outpace the amount
of illicit profits the retailer garnered. For further discussion, see Stan Karas, The Role of
Fluid Recovery in Consumer Protection Litigation: Kraus v. Trinity Management
Services, 90 CAL. L. REV. 959, 981–84 (2002); see also McCall, supra note 122, at 845–
49.
180. Kraus, 999 P.2d at 724. The defendant was concerned that absent class
certification, a defendant in a UCL action where fluid recovery was permitted may
remain subject to innumerable future lawsuits based on the same conduct and raising the
same issues as the initial litigation despite the fact that the defendant has previously
prevailed. Id.
181. Id. at 746 (Werdegar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. For further discussion see Karas, supra note 179, at 988.
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Restitution is intended to return parties to their status prior to the
commission of the violations of Section 17200 et seq. Such
restitution calculates gains and losses by and from the violations
committed, and includes consideration of offsetting benefits against
incurred losses where applicable. If restitution cannot be provided
to individuals suffering loss or it would be unfairly burdensome to
defendants or impractical to require it, it may be accomplished
through fluid recovery or cy pres means intended to benefit the
general grouping of persons suffering losses from the violations at
issue.
The foregoing language requires close causation between the section
17200 violation and the monetary remedy. Only profits stemming
directly from the unfair act should be awarded. Further, allowing for
fluid recovery when consumers cannot be easily restored prevents unfair
players in the market from reaping the benefits of their unfair acts
simply because their victims cannot be readily found.183
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to the passage of Proposition 64, enforcement of California’s
UCL was clearly chaotic. Private attorney general claims were filed on
behalf of the public without prosecutors ever knowing that an unfair act,
which harmed the public at large, had been alleged. Settlements on
behalf of all Californians were entered into, yet purported benefits to
consumers went undisclosed. Businesses that complied with regulatory
action subsequently found themselves defending a private attorney
general suit over the same matter they thought they had resolved.
Nearly a decade after the legislature’s own Law Revision Commission
proposed several procedural improvements to the UCL and despite
numerous attempts at reform, California’s UCL was still in need of a
“traffic cop.”184
183. Cf. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 570–71 (Cal. 1986):
Fluid recovery may be essential to ensure that the policies of disgorgement or
deterrence are realized. [Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 676 (7th Cir. 1981).]
Without fluid recovery, defendants may be permitted to retain ill gotten gains
simply because their conduct harmed large numbers of people in small
amounts instead of small numbers of people in large amounts.
184. Who’s on First?, supra note 59, at 2. In recent years, legislative consensus
regarding the UCL appeared only to have achieved the removal of the topic from the
Law Revision Commission’s agenda, which was accomplished in 2000. See Wheaton,
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Lawsuits were threatened and settlements were entered into on behalf
of the public, but too often the result was merely personal gain rather
than vindication of the public interest. When California’s UCL is abused,
the avenger may, indeed, be guilty of the greater crime. Proposition 64
provides the necessary review of section 17200 claims, by ensuring that
all representative actions are funneled through class action procedures.
These procedures will no longer allow unscrupulous plaintiffs to willynilly blow the whistle of unfair competition without properly investigating
their claims or convincing the court that they are competent to protect
the public interest.
Proposition 64 goes a long way toward improving California’s UCL,
but the effects of class action certification and the establishment of a
harm requirement has yet to be seen. To be sure, the number of section
17200 actions will be reduced. Nonetheless, it should be remembered
that the goal of California’s UCL is to ensure fair dealing. State
prosecutors and regulatory agencies should be the first line of defense.
When they fail, the public should have the ability to step in, provided
that private plaintiffs demonstrate that their claims truly represent the
public interest pled. If profits are gained through unlawful, unfair, or
fraudulent acts, those profits should be disgorged if the alleged victims
can demonstrate a property interest, but the remedy should not be
disproportionate to the harm caused. Foremost, once litigated, representative
claims should be put to rest, and only persons actually harmed should
have claims to be restored.
MATHIEU BLACKSTON

supra note 30, at 443. Though an active legislative topic for several years efforts at
reform were stagnant prior to Proposition 64. Wheaton states that in 2001 several bills
were circulating that would have limited the scope of section 17200 and benefited
defendants but that few “observers of the legislative scene” were willing to predict that
UCL reform would be forthcoming. Id.
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